
Human societies have always depended on minerals for their survival and development. From the Stone Age to the Industrial Revolution and today’s digital economy, each phase of progress has been shaped by the minerals it relied upon. What has changed is not the importance of minerals, but which minerals matter most. In recent decades, a group known as critical minerals has come into sharp focus. Minerals such as rare earths, copper, graphite, and rutile are now needed with global demand expected to double by 2040. Unlike other commodities, CM have supply chains that are geographically concentrated, technically complex, and politically sensitive, making them strategic assets increasingly influenced by geo-politics rather than market forces alone. As major economies move quickly to secure these minerals and setting up well documented strategies, attention has turned once again to African countries including Malawi. Yet, despite its endowment of CM, Malawi has yet to clearly define its role in this global supply chain. Without a deliberate strategy, the country risks repeating the historical pattern where resource wealth fails to translate into lasting economic benefit.
There is no universally accepted definition of CM. In most developed economies, they are defined as minerals that are essential to advanced manufacturing, clean energy technologies, and defense systems, but whose supply chains are vulnerable to disruption. While these minerals often overlap with those used in renewable energy, CM are frequently and incorrectly treated as synonymous with green energy transition minerals. In truth however, CM extend far beyond renewable energy in fact, around 60% of the minerals listed as critical by the European Union and United States have no direct energy-transition use. Their criticality instead lies beyond their importance but more towards their vulnerability to supply chain disruptions. This narrow framing has increasingly been challenged by mineral-producing countries, particularly in Africa, through a simple but important question: critical to whom? Most global critical mineral lists reflect the needs of importing countries, not the development priorities of mineral rich countries. South Africa, for example, has challenged this narrow view by including coal in its list of CM despite its exclusion from most Western lists. Malawi faces a similar situation. Agro-minerals which Malawi imports such as phosphates and potash for fertilizer production hence at the core of food security, and economic stability, are rarely included in global critical mineral discussions. Yet, from a national perspective, these minerals are more critical than some globally prioritised battery minerals.
The risks of concentrated CM supply became evident in 2010, when China imposed an unofficial restriction on rare earth exports to Japan following a maritime dispute near the Senkaku Islands. At the time, China dominated global rare earth supply, and the disruption led to sharp price increases, exposing the vulnerability of narrowly concentrated critical mineral supply chains. It is against this background that import-dependent industrial economies define criticality primarily in terms of supply security, hence driving policies focused on diversification, stockpiling, recycling and strategic partnerships.
They have increasingly defined criticality by economic opportunity. They are using mineral endowments for long-term economic resilience, job creation and industrialization. This has led to a push on policies that support downstream investments. Several resource-rich countries have moved beyond simply identifying CM to actively shaping how these resources support national development through deliberate policy choices. One thing stands out CM strategies are shaped by national priorities, not one size fits all global templates.
Indonesia provides one of the clearest examples of how policy can reshape a mineral value chain. By restricting exports of raw nickel ore and implementing a coordinated industrial policy to support domestic processing, Indonesia has successfully promoted the growth of downstream industries and positioned itself as a global hub for nickel-based battery materials. Mongolia, while operating in a different political and economic context, has also sought to strengthen state oversight and maximise national benefits from its mineral resources through strategic licensing, infrastructure development, and tighter control of mineral exports.
2.2.2 Africa
Across Africa, several countries are beginning to adopt more strategic approaches to CM. Ghana’s green minerals policy emphasizes stronger state participation and align-ment of mineral development with national industrial goals. Ethiopia has focused on tightening licensing regimes and formalising artisanal and small-scale mining to im-prove governance and value capture. Meanwhile, countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe have used export bans or quotas on certain miner-als to encourage domestic processing and increase leverage within global markets.
Malawi’s economy has traditionally been anchored in agriculture, particularly tobacco exports, with mining playing a relatively minor role, contributing less than 1% to the GDP. In recent years however, Malawi is increasingly emerging as a country with significant potential in the global CM landscape. The country hosts a wide range of critical mineral reserves. According to the Malawi Economic Monitor (2025) published by the World Bank, Malawi is estimated to host around 2% of global rare earth element resources. It is also home to the world’s largest known natural rutile deposit and the second largest flake graphite deposit. Furthermore, Malawi’s average uranium concentration per square kilometer is nearly three times the global average. Although most of these discoveries remain at the exploration stage, their scale and diversity are difficult to ignore. Table1: Some of the notable CM projects in Malawi. Modified from malawi economic monitor 2025: The rising cost of inaction
|
Project |
Stage |
Commodity |
Utilities |
|
Kasiya-Sovereign Metals Ltd. |
PFS Complete, PFS, Optimization ongoing |
Rutile, Graphite |
Rutile: pigment for paints, aerospace titanium; Graphite: battery anodes, refractories |
|
Malingunde-Sovereign Metals Ltd. |
Environmental & social studies complete, moving towards PFS |
Graphite |
Battery anodes, lubricants, refractories, fuel cells |
|
Mkango Resources Ltd. |
DFS Complete, MDA signed |
Rare Earth Elements |
Permanent magnets, electronics, clean energy technologies, defense technologies |
|
Kangankunde-Lindian Resources Ltd |
Development (early construction works), fully funded to first production |
Rare Earth Elements |
Permanent magnets, electronics, clean energy technologies, defense technologies |
|
Kanyika-Globe Metals & Mining |
DFS Complete, awaiting MDA and final permits |
Niobium, Tantalum |
Steel alloys, aerospace, electronics, superalloys |
|
Lotus Resources Ltd. |
Mining |
Uranium |
Nuclear power generation, medical isotopes |
|
Globe Metals & Mining |
Exploration |
Uranium |
Nuclear power generation, medical isotopes |
|
MAWEI Mining |
Exploration |
Heavy Minerals Sands |
Construction materials, glass, ceramics, industrial minerals |
|
Chilwa Minerals Ltd |
Exploration |
Heavy Mineral Sands |
Construction materials, glass, ceramics, industrial minerals |
Malawi hosts a wide range of mineral commodities, but not all have high potential to advance national economic objectives. While the Agriculture, Tourism and Mining (ATM) strategy identifies mining as a growth sector, effective policy requires prioritization. Limited institutional capacity and capital mean that efforts must focus on CM where Malawi has scale, comparative advantage, and a viable pathway to value creation.
We also need to understand that criticality is not static. Demand shifts as technologies evolve, substitutes emerge, new reserves are developed, and supply chains diversify. In the mid-20th century, tin was essential for food packaging and electronics and was heavily stockpiled by governments. As aluminium and plastic substitutes as well as new technologies reduced tin use, demand declined sharply. By the mid-1980s, prices collapsed, leaving large stockpiles devalued. Mineral endowment alone creates no value; reserves sitting idle generate neither income nor influence. Only extraction, processing, and market integration convert geology into economic benefit.
To realize tangible gains from the current CM cycle, Malawi needs a clearly articulated national CM strategy. This strategy should guide government policy, coordinate institutions, and align investment toward activities that maximize long-term national benefit rather than short-term extraction.
Malawi must define its own list of CM based on national development objectives, industrial potential, and geological advantage. An adaptive process should be established to regularly review and update this list as markets and technologies change.
Policy tools such as export controls, “use it or lose it” licensing conditions, and fiscal incentives can accelerate exploration and project development when applied in a targeted and predictable manner. Broad, abrupt, or undifferentiated interventions risk discouraging. It is also imperative to account for cross-border policy interactions when designing domestic CM policies. While the goal is Malawi-specific policies, measures implemented without regard to actions taken in neighboring or competing jurisdictions may fail to produce the intended gains.
Institutions such as MAMICO should be adequately funded and strategically deployed to participate in exploration and downstream processing. Policies should also encourage foreign companies to list on the Malawi Stock Exchange to deepen local ownership and mobilize domestic capital.
A successful strategy requires sustained investment in skills and knowledge. Universities and technical colleges should develop specialized mining related programmes, while fostering R&D. At the same time, government human resource capacity in mineral valuation, revenue management, and contract negotiation must be strengthened.
ESG must be treated as a core pillar of Malawi’s CM strategy, economic gains cannot come at the expense of the very same communities we want to uplift, we must prioritize environmental safeguards and community engagement. ESG compliance comes with economic benefits, For example, Malawi can leverage its hydropower potential to position itself as a low-emissions producer of CM which could enhance marketability and competitiveness in international markets.
CM development must be supported by investment in energy, transport, and logistics infrastructure. Without reliable infrastructure it will be difficult to link CM to markets as well as develop downstream processing and manufacturing. Drawing lessons from other resource-rich nations, value capture lies in midstream and downstream processing and manufacturing, a direction Malawi must take. However, to be successful, downstream positioning must be incremental and selective, not aspirational across the entire value chain.
A critical minerals strategy must give equal weight to how revenues are captured and managed. Proper mineral valuation and effective revenue monitoring systems are essential to curb illicit financial flows and ensure Malawi receives fair value from its resources. Fiscal discipline and a clear plan for investing critical minerals proceeds into other productive sectors are necessary to diversify the economy and reduce vulnerability to volatile mineral prices.
As a relatively new mining jurisdiction, Malawi cannot achieve its objectives in isolation. Strategic partnerships can attract investment, support technology and skills transfer.
Malawi has already signaled intent through initiatives such as the establishment of the Malawi Mining Investment Company (MAMICO), the plans of creating a sovereign wealth fund, and the ban of raw mineral exports. But intent without strategy achieves little. Recent export bans, implemented without a clear downstream plan, slowed exploration activities while failing to deliver value addition. This is precisely what a strategy is meant to prevent.
A successful CM strategy will require discipline, political courage, and patience. It must balance national control with investment momentum, and ambition with realism. The opportunity is real, but it is not permanent. Malawi can either act now with purpose or watch the CM moment pass it by. Additionally, a national critical minerals strategy must move beyond paper and be implemented with urgency. Without action, Malawi will remain policy-rich but outcome-poor. This paper is a call for government, the private sector, development partners, and all Malawians to act together and ensure that Malawi uses its own mineral resources to develop itself sustainably.